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Shadowing Lenders and Consumers: The Rise,
Regulation, and Risks of Non-Banks
By Shelby D. Green

I. The Rise of the Non-Bank
Since the financial crisis of 2008, “shadow banking”1
or financial transactions by “non-banks,” has skyrocketed. Non-banks are not depositary institutions and as
such, they roam free, largely outside the purview of the
bank regulators.They occupy all parts of the credit markets, from mortgage loan origination to payday lenders.2
Untethered, they operate without government guarantees, such as deposit insurance and have no access to
emergency government lending facilities, such as the
Federal Reserve’s discount window.
There are both positives and negatives in the rise of
non-banks. On the positive side is market liquidity and
greater diversity of funding sources for consumer borrowing, which is often claimed to be a more efficient
allocation of risk to investors.3 Also, by using alternative
risk metrics in loan origination, non-bank lenders are
increasingly making financing available to a particular
demographic—the financially marginal. On the negative side, the heavy reliance on government guarantees
and purchase of its loans may pose worrying systemic
risks.
A.The Presence of Non-Banks in Mortgage
Markets
Since the financial crisis of 2008 abated, non-banks
nearly tripled their mortgage market share, rising from
14% in 2007 to more than 50% in 2016.4 They originate more than 50% of all mortgages and nearly 80%
of loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA),5 which supports lower-income borrowers.
Shadow banks almost never retain originations on
their balance sheets,6 but are increasingly reliant on
the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs)(Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac), as well as the Government
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National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) to purchase their mortgages.7
In the first quarter of 2018, bank and non-bank
mortgage lenders originated 1.81 million loans for
residential properties (1 to 4 units); a third of these
mortgages were purchase mortgages, nearly onehalf were refinance mortgages and the balance, home
equity loans.8 In that total, non-banks, Quicken Loans,9
Loan Depot,10 United Wholesale Mortgage,11 Caliber
Home Loans,12 Fairway Independent Mortgage,13 and
Guaranteed Rate14 were first, fourth, fifth, seventh,
eighth, and ninth of the top ten lenders, respectively.
Banks, Wells Fargo,15 JP Morgan Chase, 16 Bank of
America, 17 and U.S. Bank18 were second, third, sixth,
and tenth, respectively.
Other lending dynamics are also changing. Down
payments are getting smaller—an average of 11.4%,
down from the traditional 20%.19 The median FICO20
score of borrowers is getting lower.21
B. Impetus for the Rise
The rise in non-bank mortgage lending seems a
consequence of both a retreat by banks and market
movements by non-banks.22 Banks are abandoning the
primary market because the new regime of banking
regulations made mortgage origination too costly.23
New regulations on balance-sheet holdings, along with
risk retention and liquidity requirements, meant higher
costs associated with originating and selling mortgages
to private label securities.24 Capital requirements that
are higher than what a firm would choose on its own,
represent lost opportunities because they reduce the
amount of funds otherwise available for lending or
investment. Banks also determined that the best way to
avoid liability from missteps in loan origination is to stay
out of the business altogether.25 Surprisingly, this retreat
was more prominent in the case of larger banks than
smaller ones; smaller banks and non-banks stepping in
to fill the void.26
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On the other side of this dynamic are the business
models used by non-banks, particularly online technology in loan origination that have lowered the logistical
barriers to entry in markets where lenders once needed
networks of physical branches to build their businesses.
These new operating models have given rise to the term
“fintech” to describe platforms that use digital tools that
eliminate intermediate parties and operate automatically.
Heightened integration, greater efficiencies, lower costs,
and improved ease of use for customers have proven to
be ingredients for exponential growth in market share.
II. The Regulation of Non-Banks
There are reasons to be concerned about the tsunami
of non-banks in the mortgage loan origination market.
They relate to the reasons for regulating banks in the
first place and for strengthening those regulations after
the 2008 financial crisis. Recently, the former Fed Vice
Chairman, Stanley Fischer, in an assessment of the crisis, identified the non-banking sector as an important
source of vulnerability. 27 The crisis was monumental
and animated by regulatory myopia, sharp practices, and
naiveté by both borrowers and lenders. The regulators
saw only growing financial and housing markets, but
did not consider that these levels were unsustainable.28
Lenders originated loans almost at a frenzied pace for
immediate profits, not taking the long view of the market’s path. Investment banks operated on only veneers
of capital.29 Borrowers amassed gargantuan debt. Firms
depended on tens of billions of dollars of borrowing that
had to be renewed every night, secured by subprime
mortgage securities. Major firms and investors blindly
relied on the AAA credit rating given to virtually all
securities they were asked to rate, under pressure from
the financial firms that paid for the ratings. The rate of
borrowers who defaulted on their mortgages within
months after closing nearly doubled from the summer
of 2006 to late 2007, which meant that they likely took
out loans that they neither could, nor intended to repay.
Mortgage brokers were paid “yield spread premiums”
by creditors as rewards for putting borrowers into higher-cost loans; creditors passing off the risks to purchasers
of securities based on these loans. Nearly one-quarter of
all mortgages made in the first half of 2005 were interest-only loans. During the same year, 68% of “option
ARM” loans30 originated by the two biggest players in
this story, Countrywide and Washington Mutual, had
low- or no-documentation requirements.31 In 2007,
mortgage loan originations reached over $2 trillion; in
Volume 37 • Number 9 • September 2018

2008, it declined to less than $.4 trillion, only to peak
at almost $2.2 trillion in 2012 before declining again.32
A. Banking Reform under Dodd-Frank
Although Congress acted to adopt prophylactic
measures for the future, the country fell into a deep
recession that did not abate until June 2009.33 In July
2010, Congress enacted the Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).34 The act
had many aims, including to “create a sound economic
foundation to grow jobs, protect consumers, rein in
Wall Street …end bailouts … and to prevent another
financial crisis.”35 To achieve these aims, the legislation
required prudent practices by creditors by limits on
market activities posing significant systemic risks and
by capital requirements. It also prohibited unfair lending practices and required plain language disclosures by
creditors that would enable borrowers to make wise
selections among financial products and services that
best meet their needs.
1. Consolidation and Prudence
Dodd-Frank established the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC) to monitor systemic risk
and consolidated bank regulators from five agencies to
four, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC),36 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC),37 National Credit Union Association
(NCUA),38 and the Federal Reserve Board.39 New regulations include enhanced safety and soundness limits,40
liquidity and capital requirements,41 and consumer safeguards.42 Together and separately, regulators have effective control over the life of banks, through the power
to withdraw deposit insurance, revoke a charter, or take
over one that is at risk of failing.
B. Control of Government-Sponsored
Enterprises by the Federal Housing
Finance Agency
The crisis could not have caught on without the
support from the GSEs. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
were profit-seeking, shareholder-owned corporations
that had the advantage of their government-sponsored
status to amass an undiversified investment portfolio
of home mortgages and derivatives of more than $1.5
trillion.43 When the crisis was at its worst, more than
20% of these mortgages were in default.44 To head off
the GSEs’ collapse, Congress passed the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”)45 to
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consolidate and strengthen their regulation. HERA created the Federal Housing and Finance Agency (FHFA)
giving it enhanced safety and soundness powers over
the GSEs, resembling those of the federal bank regulators. FHFA’s powers are draconian—it can set capital
standards, order the GSEs to cease any activity or divest
any asset that poses a threat to financial soundness, even
replace management and take over control of the firms
if they became seriously undercapitalized. One of the
FHFA’s first actions was to place both Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac in “voluntary” conservatorship. The two
GSEs continued to operate under an agreement with
the Treasury, which had provided capital to the them, by
means of preferred stock purchases, to ensure that each
remained solvent.46
IV. The New Regulatory Regime for
Non-Banks: CFPB
Although not subject to the capital requirements of
Dodd-Frank, non-banks are yet subject to consumer
protection and transparency laws promulgated by the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The
CFPB was directed to bring the consumer protection
regulation of depository and non-depository financial
institutions into closer alignment and to provide federal
oversight of both non-bank companies and banks in the
mortgage market.47 It does this by conferring upon the
CFPB jurisdiction over “covered persons,”48 as opposed
to the particular activities in which they engage.49 This
means that if an entity is subject to the CFPB’s supervisory authority, the entire entity must comply with all
federal consumer financial laws, and the CFPB has the
power to assess the entire enterprise’s compliance systems and procedures to control risks to consumers or
to markets.
A. CFPB Regulations on Safety and Soundness
Dodd-Frank notably granted the CFPB the power
to write new mortgage loan origination and servicing
standards. All of these rules apply to depository institutions and non-banks alike. In its initial series of rulemakings, the CFPB aimed to ensure creditors and borrowers
make intelligent loan decisions and that the borrower
understands the risks of the undertaking.
Specifically, the regulations require lenders to determine the borrower’s ability to repay the loan (ATR).50
This determination must be made only after the examination of objective evidence, such as bank statements,
14 • Banking & Financial Services Policy Report

pay stubs, tax returns, credit reports, rental payment history, and utility payments, among other things.51 There
would no longer be “no doc” and “low-doc” loans.
The CFPB also introduced the concept of “Qualified
Mortgage” that gives rise to a presumption that the
ATR requirements are satisfied.52 With certain specific
exceptions, for a loan to be a qualified mortgage it must
satisfy certain product limitations and requirements.53
These include having a term that does not exceed 30
years; does not charge points and fees that exceed a specific threshold54; does not contain interest-only, negative
amortization, or balloon-payment terms; and does not
exceed a 43 percent maximum debt-to-income ratio.55
Appraisals are required for higher priced loans,56 and
the appraiser must inspect the interior of the property.57
New rules also require homeownership counseling.58
IV. The Risks of Alternative Lending
Do the ATR and disclosure requirements portend
higher quality and safer lending in the growing world
of alternative banking? The same and different market
dynamics may be pushing us toward the same and perhaps more intense crisis than in 2008. In general, mortgage loans originated by non-banks are of a lower credit
quality than those originated by banks.59 Non-banks are
capturing (and aggressively pursuing)60 a larger percentage of financially vulnerable borrowers—those with less
income and wealth, those that are less likely to have
college degrees and those that are more likely to be
from a minority group.61 Over half of the loans originated by some non-banks are to borrowers with FICO
scores below 660—a benchmark often used to denote
subprime.62 Given these characteristics, shadow bank
loans are more likely to default than traditional bank
loans.63 High-delinquency rates portend dislocations in
the market.64
Just as before the crisis, but perhaps more so, nonbank lenders rely on the support that the GSEs (as well
as Ginnie Mae) provide to the conforming mortgage
market through the purchase of these loans, despite
FHFA constraints.65
The borrowers are the same as those who suffered
most in the financial crisis. In 2017, the Federal Reserve
reported that in 2016, among home-purchase mortgages, 69 percent of blacks and 60 percent of Hispanic
whites took out a nonconventional loan, that is, loans
with mortgage insurance or other guarantees, including
Volume 37 • Number 9 • September 2018

the FHA and the VA, whereas 35 percent of non-Hispanic whites and only 16 percent of Asians did so.66
Nonconventional loans usually have a higher loan-tovalue ratio. Non-banks originated a higher share of
their home-purchase loans to minority borrowers and
in low- to moderate-income neighborhoods (LMI)
while large banks originated a significantly lower share
of home-purchase mortgages to LMI borrowers.67
What may be even more concerning is that the
assessment of credit risk may be camouflaged by the
non-banks’ use of alternative metrics, instead of FICO
scores, in loan origination.68 Algorithms that evaluate
nontraditional, alternative information sources (such as
insurance claims, utility bills, social networks, and data
from Amazon and eBay),69 may produce high “loan
grades” for some borrowers who would be classified
as subprime by traditional criteria.70 The CFPB regulations do not require the use of FICO, only that lenders make the ATR determination based upon objective
evidence. Surprisingly, despite the ready market that the
GSEs and Ginnie Mae provide, non-bank loans carry
interest rates that appear to be on average about 3.7
basis points higher than similar loans issued by traditional bank lenders.71
A. Remembrance of Things Past: Systemic
Risks Looming
Just as before, an excessive proliferation of risky
FHA-insured loans to financially vulnerable borrowers
portends system-wide risk from higher rates of defaults
that, in turn, could result in huge counterparty risk.72
Low down payments and high debt-to-income ratios
increase the likelihood of default. These circumstances
make the non-bank mortgage sector a significant channel for systems liquidity risks.73 These risks could lead to
important dislocations in mortgage markets, especially
for minority and lower-income borrowers. Because the
government is heavily invested in non-bank lending, it
will be required to backstop the loans, and because of
the limited resources, the government parties are less
likely to recover anything.74

risks and covenant violations leading to cancellations of
the lines.76 If a financial crisis were to occur today, nonbanks may not have the resources to survive.77
V. Necessary Reforms for Safety
and Soundness
Did the regulations overcorrect? Did they portend
a crisis of another sort? The immediate reaction to the
crisis caused a dramatic repricing of risk through tighter
lending terms that reduced the supply of credit to all but
those who didn’t need it. The market stalled. Ensuring
access to credit in underserved communities surely is
an important social policy, but it also calls for scrutiny
against the kind of overreaching that put so many hapless borrowers in severe financial trouble leading to the
crisis.78 Non-banks must not be allowed to operate in
the shadows, but must be held up against safety and
soundness measures that are calibrated to the risk inherent in lending on the edges. On the borrowing side of
the transactions, the use of untested and unconventional
criteria for assessing creditworthiness should be allowed
only as a comparative measure. The ATR requirement
should include an assessment of whether the borrower
will have residual income, that is, income for food, clothing, transportation, medical expenses, and other day-today living expenses after paying for the expenses related
to the home.79 For vulnerable borrowers, those with just
enough qualifying income, but little available for contingencies, a new type of mortgage might be prescribed,
one that automatically indexes payments (and not necessarily interest rates) to local economic conditions,
causing them to adjust as local economic conditions,
and perhaps even personal circumstances (such as a job
change or unexpected medical expense) change. On the
lending side, non-banks should be required to “maintain
buffers of liquid assets that are sized according to the
risk that their liability will run off quickly in a stress
situation.”80 Most importantly, the government should
heed the lessons from the crisis and step back to assess
the larger market and demographic changes to see if the
trends are positive or threatening.
Notes

Even as banks retreat from direct lending, they still
support the business through warehouse lending to nonbanks, through lines of credit as opposed to direct lending to mortgage borrowers.75 Reliance on warehouse
lending is risky, given the presence of margin calls due
to aging risk, market-to-market evaluations, roll over
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deposits. Other times, shadow banking is used to refer to financial activity that is ineligible for a government backstop,” that is,
deposit insurance and access to the Federal Reserve’s discount
window. E.V. Murphy, Who regulates whom and how? An overview
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13. Total mortgage originations climbing 28% to 14,655 mortgages, with dollar volume moving up 37% to $3.8 billion. Id.
14. Total mortgage originations rose 4% to 11,525 mortgages, with
dollar volume rising 7% to $3.6 billion. Id.
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it originated, 44,320 in total, plunged 37% from a year ago
and the dollar volume of mortgages originated plunged 30% to
$14.5 billion. Id.
16. For Chase, mortgage originations dropped 21% to 27,329
mortgages, with dollar volume dropping by 21% to $8.6 billion.
Id.
17. For Bank of America, mortgage originations plunged 43% to
14,325 mortgages, with dollar volume plunging 37% to $5.9
billion. Id.
18. For U.S. Bank, mortgage loan originations headed downward
24% to 10,817 mortgages, with dollar volume dropping 19% to
$3.6 billion. Id.
19. This is largely on account of the FHA loan guarantees that
allow a 3.5% downpayment.
20. FICO scores range from 300 to 900 points. https://www.bankrate.com/finance/credit/what-is-good-fico-score.aspx.
21. In 2015, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland reported that
26 percent of FHA loans originated in 2014 were subprime
and another 40 percent were near-prime, having FICO scores
between 661 and 700. .Marshall Lux and Robert Greene,
What’s Behind the Non-Bank Mortgage, Boom? June 2015,
Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Weil
Hall, Harvard Kennedy School, www.hks.harvard.edu/mrcbg,
(“Lux and Greene”) at 22, citing Yuliya Demyanyk and Daniel
Kolliner, FHA Lending Rebounds in Wake of Subprime Crisis,
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (Apr. 2015).
22. Id. at 21.
23. Id.; see also Morris-Levenson, supra n.3, at 2 (“The decline in
bank participation in the mortgage business has coincided with
reforms to bank capital and liquidity regulation during the
period following the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, as
well as other changes in the mortgage finance market-related
to the underlying business cycle.”)
24. Morris-Levenson, supra n.23, at 7.
25. Buchak, supra n.5, at 2; see also Julapa Jagtiani, Catharine
Lemieux, Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion, Risk Pricing, &
Alternative Pricing, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, July 6, 2017)
at 2, 22–23, 26, 28 (positing that the decline in the number
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Rachel Norvell, “Big banks’ declining mortgage volumes signal
shift in market,” Mortgage Professional America (Oct. 2014)
(documenting recent quarterly and annual losses in mortgage
profitability for JPMorgan, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and Bank of
America).
26. Morris-Levenson, supra n.3, at 2.
27. Fischer, supra n.2, at 1. After the second largest non-bank mortgage originator, New Century, collapsed, the effects cascaded
throughout the financial industry, eventually to the banking
sector. Loans became harder to obtain and non-banks had no
access to funding. Id. at 2–3. Before the crisis, non-banks were
subject to the existing Truth in Lending Act standards, as well
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Financial Inquiry, supra n.29, at xxiii-iv.
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12 U.S.C. § 5301.
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ipants, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission.
See generally Murphy, supra n.1, at 8.
Among other things, safety and soundness relates to risk management (by considering default risk and prepayment risk), the
diversification of a bank’s portfolio, as well as ensuring adequate
training and expertise of management and staff, and adequate
procedures for internal controls. Id. at 16–17.
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defined in various ways—to increase the resilience of firms
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taxpayers when failures occur. Morris-Levenson, supra n.3, at
6–7. For larger, more complex banks, higher standards apply to
those that are globally and systemically important. Id. at 5–6.
New regulations require that certain banks hold sufficient liquid assets to withstand a temporary inability to refinance on the
markets. Id. at 7.
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48. Under Section 1024(a)(1)(C), (12 U.S.C. 5514(a)(1)(C)) of
Dodd-Frank, the CFPB has the authority to supervise any
nonbank covered person that the Bureau “has reasonable cause
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private education loans, and (c) payday loans; and (2) larger
participant[s] of a market for other consumer financial products
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50. 12 CFR § 1026.43(c).
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52. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2) and § 1026.43(e)(4).
53. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(ii)(B)(2).
54. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(3).
55. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(ii)(B)(2), (vi).
56. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.35(a)(1).
57. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.35(c)(3)
58. Creditors must provide a list of homeownership counseling
organizations, with prescribed text on the efficacy and value
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days of application and the creditor must confirm compliance,
upon written certification from the counselor. Counseling
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prohibited the “yield spread premium,” 12 C.F.R. § 1026.36(d)
(1), steering, 12 C.F.R. § 1026.36(e), mandatory arbitration and
waivers of consumer rights, 12 C.F.R. § 1026.36(h), financing
credit insurance premiums, 12 C.F.R. § 1026.36(i), and negative
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amortization loans to first-time borrowers without counseling.
12 C.F.R. § 1026.36(k).
Kim, supra n.7, at 38.
Ads for the Quicken Loan “rocket mortgage” are ubiquitous.
The Lending Tree puppet invites loan applications from home
in one’s pajamas.
Kim, supra n.7, at 38. The rate of home purchase loans for blacks
in 2016 was 6 percent, up from 5.5 percent in 2015 and for
Hispanic whites 8.8 percent, up from 8.3 percent. Bhutta, supra
n.4, at 8. Both rates are well-below their pre-crisis peak (2006) of
8.7 percent and 11.7 percent, respectively. Id. From 2015 to 2016,
there was a small increase in loans to low- and moderate-income
areas. Id. Slightly more than half of the home-purchase loans in
these areas were nonconventional loans. Id. at 13.
Lux and Greene, supra n.21, at 22.
Buchak, supra n.5, at 22–23 (reporting that non-fintech shadow
bank borrowers are about 10% more likely to default on their
loans compared to traditional bank borrowers).
Kim, supra n.7, at 38. In the third quarter of 2017, the serious
delinquency rate on FHA and VA mortgages for single-family
homes was 4% and 2%, respectively, and from GSE pools, just
under 1%. Id; see also Lux and Greene, supra n.21, at 22 (reporting that “although after the crisis, the mix of deep subprime
and subprime FHA originations shifted substantially, i.e., lenders all but stopped making deep subprime loans, with a concomitant increase in subprime and prime lending, the overall
performance of the FHA mortgage market has not improved—
the default rate of all FHA loans combined remains higher
than it was before the onset of the subprime boom in 2003.”);
see generally Urban Institute Housing Financing at a Glance
(Dec. 2017).
Office of the Inspector General, FHFA, Recent Trends in the
Enterprises’ Purchases of Mortgages from Smaller Lenders and
Nonbank Mortgage Companies (EVL-2014-010, Jul. 2014), at
17 (non-banks accounted for 26.3 percent of agency purchase
mortgage loans originated in December 2012, by December
2014, that number had grown to 48.37 percent). AEI’s
International Center on Housing Risk, www.housingrisk.org.
Bhutta, supra n.5, at 1, 3.
Id at 23–24; see also Kim, supra note at 3, 4. In 2016, 64% of the
mortgages originated by non-banks were for black and Hispanic
borrowers and 58% were living in low- or moderate-income
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76.
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tracts. Id. at 4. They are less likely to have college degrees and
have less income and wealth. Id. at 38.The debt-to-income ratio
is higher, id. at 38, and the FICO credit score is lower by 5 points
for GSE pools and 25 points for Ginnie Mae. Consequently, the
delinquency rate is significantly higher. Id. at 38.
Jagtiani, supra n.25, at 31. The same FICO scores, those who
borrow from the Lending Club have a higher risk of becoming
delinquent (measuring credit card holders). Id. at 31.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 2, 26, 28.
Buchak supra n.5, at 21–22. The Federal Reserve reported that
black and Hispanic borrowers had the highest incidences of
higher-priced loans within both the conventional and nonconventional loan types, 15.7 percent and 17.9 percent, compared
to 6.2 for non-Hispanic whites. Bhutta, supra n.5, at 17–18.
See also Jagtiani supra n.25, at 29–30.
Lux and Greene, supra n.21, at 3.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 8. After a borrower is approved by the non-bank originator, it funds the loan through a line of credit from a warehouse lender, which typically funds 95% of the mortgage
balance. The total volume of warehouse lending at the end
of 2016 was $40 billion; $1 trillion in loans funded over the
course of a year as compared to total mortgage origination
of $2 trillion, half of the mortgage originations. Kim, supra
n. 7, at 12. See generally Peter Rudegeair, Rachel Louise Ensign
and Coulter Jones, Big Banks Find a Back Door to Finance
Subprime Loans, Lending to nonbank Financial Firms surges to
record as banks avoid direct exposure, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
big-banks-find-a-back-door-to-finance-subprime-loans-1523352601.
Id. at 15–18.
Id. at 26.
Green, supra n.44, at 523 (“African-American and Latino borrowers had a much higher likelihood than white borrowers
with the same risk profile (e.g., credit score, income level) to be
approved for and steered toward a subprime mortgage rather
than a more affordable and predictable fixed rate mortgage.”)
The FHA already includes “residual income” as a compensating
factor in calculating the allowable DTI ratio. HUD Handbook
4000.1, Single-Family Housing Policy Handbook.
Fischer, supra n.2, at 7.
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